“With great power comes great responsibility. Remember that, Pete. Remember that.”1

With issues surrounding the intrinsic dignity of the human person now so frequently on the ballot it has never been more relevant to discuss the moral quality of the political right to vote. According to Scripture and prescribed by the natural law, governing bodies possess an intrinsic authority over their subjects, and likewise, the governing body owes its subjects an atmosphere conducive to the cultivation of virtue and human flourishing.2 The American democratic system, however, presents a unique moral dynamic, that is, the line between the governor and the governed is significantly blurred.3 While the citizen is not directly responsible for the laws of the state, he is responsible for vesting that power in an elected official.4 This political right to vote, then, carries with it the following twofold duty: (1) the civic/political duty to vote, so that there may be elected officials, and (2) the ethical duty to vote morally, so as to uphold the common good and promote human flourishing. With this conclusion, the essential question follows: What does ethical voting entail? To answer this question, it is necessary to turn to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas to understand the natural law, the nature of human action, and the cooperation with evil.

According to Saint Thomas, the natural law, understood morally, is a rational creature’s participation in the eternal law, or God’s divine providence.5 As rational beings, humans are uniquely situated in determining the will and intention of our Creator, and those things that are not in accordance with it, are, effectively, “immoral.”6 These natural, moral precepts, then, ought to be reflected and considered by our human laws.7 Saint Thomas shows us that the natural law is applied practically in our human laws by way of “determination.”8 This determination begins with the raw moral precept that originates from pure human reason, such as “thou shalt not kill (murder).”9 The practical and positive application, or determination, of these precepts, however, is a matter of cultural and societal preference and prudence; so long as they sufficiently prohibit the evil conduct or promote goodness.10 For example, the prohibition of murder and the length of sentencing for murder are of the same positive quality but differ radically as to their moral content. Accordingly, in following the natural law, one must strive to avoid participation in the implementation of laws that are contrary to the first-order natural precepts reflected in the human law. This, however, raises the next question: What does it mean to “participate” in the implementation of these laws?

While Saint Thomas himself does not use the language of participation or “cooperation” with evil, early modern thinkers like St. Alfonsus Ligouri and contemporary thinkers like the renowned Thomist, Dr. Steven A. Long, have pieced together a clear-cut theory for him.11 According to Long, there are two categories of cooperation: (1) formal cooperation; and (2) material cooperation.12 An actor formally cooperates with evil when he provides “direct and essential aid . . . with respect to the object of the agent’s act,” and materially cooperates with evil when the assistance is “purely circumstantial.”13 Finally, Long demonstrates that each category operates on a spectrum, that is, an actor’s cooperation may be more or less formal, or more or less material.14 Along these lines, he introduces the highest level of cooperation, “most formal” cooperation.15

Now, with the natural law addressed, and the categories of cooperation established, the act of voting can be properly analyzed with respect to its moral quality. All human acts, as opposed to mere “acts of man,” arise out of the rational powers of the intellect and the will.16 The intellect, through the operation of the speculative powers of man, contributes to the informed nature of the action, whereas the will is directed by human desire and choice.17 There are few human acts that encompass these powers more than the act of voting in a democratic election. As stated above, American citizens have the unique power to contribute almost directly to how they themselves are governed.18 As the epigraph of this paper foreshadowed, Americans have a great power to alter the course of their country, and accordingly, they must act with great care in exercising their political right to vote.19

Accordingly, it is a direct violation of natural law principles to consciously vote for a law or official that will violate a first-order natural law precept, such as “thou shalt not murder.”20 The moral weight and culpability of the cooperation through voting is determined by the requisite knowledge of the voter regarding the law or official. Therefore, if an individual votes for a provision that legalizes and expands access to abortion, he would be in formal cooperation with evil of the unjust taking of human life. Conversely, if an individual, following his moral compass to the best of his ability, votes in favor of a provision legalizing recreational marijuana, he would have likely only materially cooperated with any negative effects that stem from its ratification. This is because the act of murder is a self-evident violation of the natural law, whereas the moral quality of smoking recreational marijuana is far more ambiguous and questionable in nature.

When exercising the political right to vote, it is helpful to heed Long’s words when he states, “what is true of operation, pertains also to co-operation.”21 That is, if the voter believes that his execution of the act that the provision or official supports would violate natural law principles, his vote for such a provision or official would also be in formal cooperation with the act, and accordingly, the violation.

References:

1 Spider-Man (Sony Pictures 2002).

2 See Romans 13:1-7; Ephesians 5:21-33; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, q. 90, a. 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947).

3 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 96-97 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2010) (highlighting the American citizen’s role in the election of governing officials).

4 Id.

5 Aquinas, supra note 2, at I-II q. 91, a. 2.

6 Id. at I-II q. 94, a. 4.

7 Id. at I-II q. 95, a. 2

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 See Id.

11 Steven A. Long, The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act 210-11 (2d ed. 2015).

12 Id. at 211.

13 Id. at 210.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 67.

17 Id. at 96.

18 See de Tocqueville, supra note 3.

19 Spider-Man, supra note 1.

20 See Long, supra note 11.

21 Id.