During the Covid-19 pandemic, many employers were inundated with religious exemption requests to mandated vaccination policies.[1] Having to review hundreds of requests in a short period of time taxed human resource departments and raised novel legal issues, including how to evaluate requests fairly and consistently.[2] While pandemic labor shortages increased the urgency of rapidly processing accommodations, businesses knew that they had to proceed carefully since improper denials can trigger Title VII discrimination claims.[3] Some employees, who were denied religious accommodations and terminated for noncompliance, later filed Title VII religious discrimination claims against their former employers.[4] Nearly five years after the pandemic, “decisions made during the pandemic continue to create challenges for employers—and provide[] important insight into the EEOC’s current enforcement priorities.”[5] Many religious accommodation claims have been resolved, but some are still being litigated.

Recent changes to federal vaccination policy,[6] as well as the outbreak of measles in the United States[7] are reminders of the importance of carefully crafted religious accommodation policies. In two recent seminal cases, the Supreme Court expanded employee rights to religious accommodations and consequently raised the burden on employers to defend against discrimination claims.[8] To satisfy this burden, employers must tailor their policies to the standards as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT

In 2015, the Supreme Court in Abercrombie expanded employee rights and increased employer liability to religious discrimination claims.[9] In that case, Abercrombie & Fitch refused to hire a practicing Muslim woman who wore a headscarf to her interview.[10] The employer believed, without being told, that she wore it for religious purposes. Since headscarves conflicted with its dress policy, Abercrombie chose not to hire the applicant.[11] The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on the employee’s behalf claiming its refusal to hire her was a violation of Title VII.[12]

Prior to Abercrombie, an employer could defend against a religious discrimination claim by showing its policy was neutral—i.e., one that affects all employees equally.[13]  But in Abercrombie, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a neutral policy serves as an affirmative defense to religious discrimination.[14] Instead, it held that “Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation. ”[15] Accordingly, it granted religious accommodation a favored status. Rejecting neutral policy as a defense, it left employers only one affirmative defense to religious discrimination claims: Employers must demonstrate undue hardship to deny religious accommodations.[16]

Additionally, the Court dispensed with the employer’s knowledge requirement. An employer does not have to have “actual knowledge of a conflict between” a religious practice and a work policy to violate Title VII.[17] To allege discrimination an employee need only show that his or her need for a religious accommodation was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s adverse employment decision.[18] Put differently, the precedent established by the Court in Abercrombie limits the employer’s defense in religious accommodation suits: the employer must show an accommodation would cause it undue hardship to justify denying the accommodation.[19]     The consequential question which followed Abercrombie became: how does an employer prove undue hardship? In 2023, the Supreme Court answered this question and clarified the federal standard for undue hardship. In so doing, it once again raised the burden for employers.

SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN IS MORE THAN A DE MINIMIS COST

Since 1977, courts relied on what Groff would later call the “erroneous de minimis interpretation of Hardison,” allowing employers to deny accommodations that cost more than a de minimis amount.[20] While Groff did not abrogate Hardison, the Supreme Court corrected the low standard for undue hardship. [21] Since Groff, employers must show that granting a particular individual’s accommodation would cost a substantial amount—“more than de minimis cost.”[22] Further, to properly substantiate undue hardship requires that the employer perform a “fact-specific inquiry”  into how each accommodation request affects an individual’s role and duties in the company.[23] The same accommodation request made by employees with different roles might work a substantial hardship in one type of role, but not in another.[24]

Further, the Court clarified that employers must do more than “assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation.”[25] Instead, “Title VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee’s practice of religion.”[26] While the difference may seem semantic, the Court insisted that the “distinction matters.”[27] Groff requires that employers consider “other options, such as voluntary shift swapping”[28] to reasonably accommodate religious preferences. Since Groff, courts now require an employer to show that it first analyzed the cost of granting a religious accommodation to a specific employee before it can determine that granting the accommodation would be a substantial burden. Accordingly, this requires employers to analyze each employee’s accommodation request on a “case by case” basis.[29]

A Florida case illustrates the depth to which an employer must analyze the burden of granting an accommodation. In Scafidi, an employee of a pharmaceutical company, which required its customer-facing employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations during the pandemic, requested a religious accommodation for the vaccine.[30] Her employer denied the request and she brought suit.[31] At the summary judgment stage, the court denied the employer’s summary judgment.[32] In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the employer had not adequately analyzed whether the accommodation would work a substantial hardship because it had not calculated the cost of reconfiguring the employee’s sales route to accommodate her exemption.[33] The employer alleged that granting her accommodation would work a substantial burden because reconfiguring her sales route was complex and a similar calculation in the past took “eighteen months and involve[d]” the work of analysts and executives. [34] The court held this was insufficient proof of a substantial burden because the employer did not actually “do any analysis to determine the cost of reconfiguring” this particular employee’s territory.[35]

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Fortunately, the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic has ended.[36] But the lessons from the pandemic continue to inform corporate policy. Religious accommodation policy should adhere to recently clarified standards. Together, Abercrombie and Groff interpret Title VII to require employers to accommodate religious exemptions absent a showing of substantial hardship. Groff requires that employers substantiate a substantial financial hardship. A risk-averse employer will analyze each employee’s role individually and be able to substantiate how an accommodation would create a hardship before denying the request.  Alternatively, while analyzing an employee’s specific role, an employer may find a potential solution that would minimize the burden and thus be able to grant the accommodation without incurring an undue hardship. Lastly, when writing accommodation policy, employers must remember that they may not rely on neutral policies to defend against a discrimination claim.[37]  The Supreme Court firmly rejected this defense in Abercrombie.[38]

Whether arising from extraordinary events such as COVID-19, a resurgence of a highly contagious disease, or from routine requests similar to Abercrombie, religious accommodation requests must be proactively managed to reduce discrimination claims. Developing policy in advance of pandemics or disease outbreaks will allow employers to respond with sound, pre-vetted frameworks without the time constraints and unique pressures present during epidemics.

[1] Judging ‘Sincerely Held’ Religious Belief Is Tricky for Employers Mandating Vaccines, NPR (Oct. 4, 2021, 12:51 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2021/10/04/1042577608/religious-exemptions-against-the-covid-19-vaccine-are-complicated-to-get (“‘Employers are being flooded with these requests [for religious exemptions], and are having to evaluate them in large numbers,’ says Alana Genderson, an attorney specializing in labor and employment law at the firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.”).

[2] Erik Eisenmann, Chengzhuo He & Samantha Bowie, EEOC Scrutinizes Vaccine Mandates: Continued Rise of Religious Accommodation Claims, HUSCH BLACKWELL (June 2, 2025), https://www.laborandemploymentlawinsights.com/2025/06/eeoc-scrutinizes-vaccine-mandates-continued-rise-of-religious-accommodation-claims/ (“The COVID-19 pandemic brought workplace vaccination policies to the forefront, raising complex questions about religious accommodations.”).

[3] See generally id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Title VII religious accommodation provision); EEOC, Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace (explaining the interactive process and risks of improper denial).

[4] Andrew Scroggins & James Nasiri, Spike in Religious Discrimination Charges Stemming from COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Fuels Increase in EEOC Charges, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP WORKPLACE ACTION BLOG (July 19, 2023), https://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2023/07/spike-in-religious-discrimination-charges-stemming-from-covid-19-vaccine-mandates-fuels-increase-in-eeoc-charges/.

[5] Eisenmann et al., supra note 2.

[6] Emily Mullin, No One Knows Where US Vaccine Policy Goes Next, WIRED (Apr. 10, 2026, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/no-one-knows-where-us-vaccine-policy-goes-next/ (“Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s sweeping changes to federal vaccine guidance are paused for now. But even if they’re reversed, lasting damage has already been done.”).

[7] Alison Young, Where Measles Is Spreading in the U.S.: Outbreaks Fuel Infections in States Coast to Coast, HEALTHBEAT (Apr. 9, 2026, 9:27 PM), https://www.healthbeat.org/2026/04/09/where-measles-is-spreading-april-2026/.

[8] See generally EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015); Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023).

[9] See generally Abercrombie, 575 U.S. 768.

[10] Id. at 770.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 771.

[13] Abercrombie, 575 U.S. 768, 781 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[U]nlike the majority, I adhere to what I had thought before today was an undisputed proposition: mere application of a neutral policy cannot constitute ‘intentional discrimination.'”).

[14] Id. at 775 (“Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious practices . . . [it] requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.”) (rejecting Abercrombie’s argument that its “no headwear” policy was a complete defense to religious discrimination because the policy applied uniformly to all employees).

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id. at 774.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 772 (“[A]n employer [must demonstrate] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j))).

[20]Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977), holding modified by Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 143 (2023).

[21] See generally Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023).

[22] Id. at 468.

[23] Id. (explaining that “‘undue hardship’ is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business).

[24] See generally Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 2011 WL 13175784, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2011) (explaining that the EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 12-IV, gives examples of undue hardship).         

[25] Id. at 473.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544, 551 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Determining what is reasonable is a fact-specific determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.”) (citation omitted).

[30] Scafidi v. Braun Med., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2024).

[31] Id. at 1234.

[32] Id. at 1246.

[33] Id. at 1245 (“Braun did not do any analysis to determine the costs of reconfiguring Scafidi’s territory if any hospitals denied her admission. . . . And, indeed, Braun has not presented any estimate of the costs it would have incurred if it had allowed Scafidi to retain her position without getting vaccinated.”)

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] See End of the Federal COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/end-of-phe.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2026) (“[T]he federal COVID-19 PHE declaration ended on May 11, 2023.”).

[37] Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 781.

[38] Id.